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INTRODUCTION 
The United States has experienced a revival of interest in entrepreneurs.
1
  While much of 
the public fascination has focused on “dot com” millionaires and similar high-profile 
phenomena, a coincident surge in research has focused on the economic foundations of this 
boom.  In executing their research strategy, analysts are confronted with the interrelated issues of 
deciding “who is an entrepreneur” and identifying data sources suitable to analyze 
entrepreneurial behavior.  In many instances, the focus has been on those individuals who 
identify themselves as self-employed in large cross-sectional data sets like the Census or Current 
Population Survey (CPS), or panel data sets such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID), Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), National Longitudinal Survey 
(NLS), or Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
2
 
While the existing empirical literature on the nature and causes of entrepreneurship is 
interesting and informative, it remains the case that woefully little is known about who really is 
an entrepreneurs, and how sensitive earlier results are to variations in the definition of 
entrepreneurship.  Survey data sources often provide a wealth of demographic and financial data 
for a large number of respondents, but bring with it uncertainty over the ability to define and 
describe the sample of entrepreneurs.  It is valuable to learn if the results of earlier studies may 
be applicable to other definitions of “entrepreneur,” either more narrow or more broad.   
To address this, we examine trends in various forms of entrepreneurship via a large 
sample of individual tax return data.  While tax returns also carry some drawbacks, they provide 
a reliable source of microdata on entrepreneurship.  The use of tax-return data also presents 
researchers with multiple indicators of business activity, each of which is a potential means of 
classifying entrepreneurs.   
For purposes of building a “bridge” to related studies, our objective herein is to examine 
how the choice of definition for “entrepreneur” affects the estimated levels and dynamic patterns  
of entrepreneurship using tax data.  In particular, we focus on the role of access to capital in 
influencing the dynamics of entrepreneurship.  Additionally, a number of important tax policy 
changes during the 1980s might have affected entrepreneurial activity.  Perhaps most important 
was a dramatic change in the relative payroll tax (i.e., FICA and SECA) treatment of the self-
employed vis-à-vis employees (see Bruce [2000]).  Further, changes in marginal income tax rates 
such as those in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 might have altered after-tax returns to 
entrepreneurship.  While we do not formally control for the effects of taxes in the analysis that 
follows, we consider their importance in discussing our primary results. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section I, we document the rising 
rate of entrepreneurship over the 1980s (1979 to 1990, to be precise) and examine the robustness 
of the estimated pattern with respect to the inclusion or exclusion of sole-proprietorship, 
partnership, sub-chapter S corporation, rental/royalty, and farm activity.  We also examine the 
degree to which the rising trend in entrepreneurship can be “explained” by factors related to 
tastes for risk or access to capital.  Section II focuses on the individual-level dynamic 
relationships among alternative indicators of entrepreneurship to see whether there exists a 
canonical “life-cycle” pattern to indicators of entrepreneurship.  The final section is a summary 
with suggestions for future research. 
To anticipate the bottom line, our examination of tax-return data indicates that the choice 
of definition for entrepreneurial activity has little impact on the overall conclusions.  The various 
indicators that we examine tend to display similar trends over time.  Access to capital or debt can 
have a positive effect on overall entrepreneurial activity, primarily through enhancing entry 
probabilities but also by reducing exit rates.  Finally, a canonical progression of entrepreneurial 
states does not emerge from the data.  In other words, entrepreneurs tend to focus on one 
particular form (e.g., self-employment, partnership, etc.) for this business, rather than moving 
through a variety of organizational forms. 
 
I. ENTREPRENEURSHIP: TAX-BASED IDENTIFIERS 
We begin our investigation by examining trends in entrepreneurship as revealed in tax 
data.   
I.A.  Data   
Our data are drawn from the University of Michigan Tax Research Database.  In 
constructing this panel data file, the Office of Tax Policy Research (OTPR) at the University of 
Michigan acquired the public-use tax return data released by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
Statistics of Income (SOI) Division and converted them to user-friendly format.  The 1979-1990 
panel is constructed from annual IRS-SOI Individual Tax Model Files, which contain up to 200 
pieces of information for between 80,000 and 250,000 personal income tax returns in each year.  
Within each Individual Model File is a subset of returns that were randomly selected to be part of 
a panel of taxpayers whose returns would be drawn year after year.  In total, the panel includes 
data from over 200,000 tax returns.  Approximately 6,000 filers are present in the panel for all 12 
years. 
 
I.B. Trends In Alternative Measures Of Entrepreneurship  
As mentioned above, taxpayer data provide a number of categories of entrepreneurial 
activity.  We focus on those with sole proprietorships (as evidenced by the presence of a 
Schedule C), partnerships, subchapter S corporations, and rental, royalty, or farm income.  
Survey data typically capture the first three of these as “self-employed,” but researchers often 
omit those in the latter categories as “partially” entrepreneurial.  As a full analysis of each of 
these individual types would be rather unwieldy, we combine them into a smaller number of 
categories of entrepreneurial activity. 
Specifically, we create four indicators for entrepreneurship, listed in increasing order of 
breadth.  The first includes those who file a Schedule C, the second also includes those with 
partnership or subchapter S corporation income, the third adds in those with rental or royalty 
income, and fourth adds those filing Schedule F for farm income.  It quickly became clear that 
the two narrowest measures performed very similarly over time, as did the two broadest 
measures.  With this background, we focus our discussion on the second and third measures of 
entrepreneurship, which we refer to as our “narrow” measure and our “broad” measure, 
respectively. 
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The starting point for our discussion of the data is Figure 1, which shows the evolution 
over the 1980s of measures of entrepreneurship.  As the figure makes transparent, the tax-based 
data display a general rise in entrepreneurship, with the trend most pronounced among joint 
returns (versus single returns).
3
  Looking more closely, one sees that for single returns the 
narrow definition rises overall, but the increase is far from uniform.  Expanding to a broad 
definition shows first an increase, followed by a decline toward the end of the decade.  For joint 
returns, the rise is fairly uniform for both measures.   
An interesting result is that none of the trends exhibit increased volatility around key tax 
policy changes.  Despite a leveling of the payroll tax playing field between wage and self-
employment in 1984 and a marginal income tax rate reduction in 1986, the general increase in 
entrepreneurial activity is uninterrupted.
4
 
Year-to-year changes in entrepreneurship follow (by definition) from shifts in the rates of 
entry into entrepreneurship and exit from entrepreneurship.  Indeed, the steady-state relationship 
between the rate of entrepreneurship, , the entry rate, e, and the exit rate, x, is given by 
 .
e
e x
 

 (1) 
Accordingly, one would expect that increases in the rate of entrepreneurship will be driven by 
either increases in the rate of entry, or decreases in the exit rate (increases in survivorship).  Of 
course, equation (1) characterizes the long-run relationship.  In the short-term, fluctuations in the 
components of (1) may not balance precisely. 
 To investigate this matter, Figures 2 and 3 show the corresponding yearly entry and exit 
rates based on our tax data.
5
  Beginning with Figure 2, one sees that over the course of the 1980s 
entry rates rose uniformly, regardless of the extensiveness of our definition or the filing status. 
The entry rates also seem to react to the increased relative payroll taxation of sole-proprietors 
enacted in 1984—all four series show a slight decrease in entry around this time.  Nonetheless, 
the general upward trend is consistent with the overall increase in entrepreneurship shown in 
Figure 1.  In comparison to Figure 1, however, entry rates are “noisier” and display a great deal 
of year-to-year fluctuation. 
This characteristic, i.e. “noise”, is even more pronounced for exit rates (see Figure 3).  
However, Figure 3 has two features that are quite different than the previous two figures.  First, 
exit rates for single returns are higher than for joint returns (the opposite is true for both entry 
rates and the overall rate of entrepreneurship).  Second, in this instance the definition of 
entrepreneurship is more important.  While exit rates fluctuate considerably, over the 1980s exit 
rates fell for three of the four possibilities.  Note, however, that for the narrow definition of 
entrepreneurship among single returns, exit rates rose.  Finally, exit rates do not display an 
upward spike around the key payroll tax reform of the mid-1980s.  This lack of a response is 
perhaps partially responsible for the more stable increase in overall activity as shown in Figure 1. 
The overall changes are made clearer when we consider the net changes over the sample 
period in entrepreneurship rates and the constituent dynamics for single and joint returns.  
Regardless of the definition of entrepreneurship, entry rates increased and exit rates decreased 
over time for joint returns, leading to an overall increase in entrepreneurship.  This is perhaps a 
result of the general increase in self-employment among women, and married women in 
particular (see Devine [1994] or Bruce [1999]).  Results for single filers are more sensitive to 
definitional issues, as the exit rate falls by a larger amount when the broader measure is used.  
Overall entrepreneurship rates and entry rates rise by similar amounts over time for single filers 
regardless of the definition.  This general finding leads us to focus on our narrow definition of 
entrepreneurship for the remainder of the analysis.   
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 I.C.  Has There Really Been a Rise in Entrepreneurship? 
 The results presented above suggest a simple story: entrepreneurship was on the rise 
during the 1980s, driven both by increased entry of new entrepreneurs and enhanced survival of 
those already in business (although the evidence is a bit less clear-cut on the latter point).  But 
why?  Much of the popular discussion focuses on an increased “taste” or proclivity for 
entrepreneurship in the United States.  In contrast, the bulk of the econometric research has 
focused on the degree to which a variety of “constraints”—taxes, access to capital, health 
insurance, discrimination—have determined rates of entrepreneurship over time, across space, or 
among races.
6
  To be sure, income tax data provide precious little information on basic 
demographic information and underlying wealth.  We make use of suitable proxies where 
appropriate. 
To investigate the underlying causes of increased entrepreneurship, we run reduced form 
regressions controlling for changes in the age-structure of our tax returns, the marital structure, 
and the number of child-based exemptions claimed.  These regressions, in effect, control for 
variations in the willingness to bear risk associated with these demographic factors, and do so in 
a non-parametric way that imposes little structure on the data.   
 In the same way, we also control for access to capital via a mortgage or personal wealth 
using indicators for the mortgage interest deduction and the presence of capital income on the tax 
return.  In each instance, we examine the contribution of each risk or capital factor to the overall 
trend in entrepreneurship.  
 Specifically, we estimate the following regression 
 
1 1 1 1 1
T T T T T
it t t it t it t it t it it
t t t t t
y A E C D
    
                 (2) 
where yit is an indicator variable for whether tax return i shows entrepreneurial activity in year t, 
Ait is an indicator variable for whether the return shows an exemption for age greater than 65, Eit 
is an indicator variable for the presence of dependent exemptions (specifically, either children at 
home or away from home), Cit is an indicator variable for capital income, and where Dit is an 
indicator variable for mortgage interest.  We estimate (2) separately for single and joint returns.  
In addition, we re-estimate (2) using as the dependent variable an indicator for entry into 
entrepreneurship and exit from entrepreneurship, respectively. 
 Notice that our specification of (2) permits the demographic variables (age and 
exemptions) to have differing impacts by year and by filing status.  Thus, the estimates of the 
coefficients provide a flexible summary of their influence on the evolution of entrepreneurship in 
the 1980s.  In a similar fashion, and the focus of more attention in what follows, we view the 
variables C and D as providing an index of entrepreneurs’ access to equity capital and debt.  
Thus, our estimated coefficients summarize the association of the changing nature of these 
financing constraints with entrepreneurship.   
 Finally, consider the role of the  terms in equation (2).  These capture the “pure”—that 
is, corrected for demographics and capital access—yearly shifts in rates of entrepreneurship, 
entry and exit.  Thus, we can think of these estimates as “regression-adjusted” trends in 
entrepreneurship. 
With this in mind, consider Figure 4, which displays for joint returns a comparison 
between the raw rates of entrepreneurship and our regression-adjusted estimates of the yearly 
shifts.
7
  Among joint returns, it is clear that the overall level of entrepreneurship is intimately tied 
to the demographic and capital structure—this is no surprise.  Interestingly, however, the overall 
rise in the raw rate (7.1 percent) exceeds our estimate of the adjusted rate (5.5 percent).  Put 
differently, the figure suggests that not all of the rise may be attributed to tastes or societal shifts 
toward entrepreneurship.   
 Is the same pattern present in the single returns?  In Figure 5, one finds that the overall 
rise in entrepreneurship is 2.7 percent.  Adjusting via our regression strategy shows that over the 
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1980s the residual increase is only 2.0 percent.  Again, at least part of the rise in entrepreneurship 
must be attributed to changes in demographics or capital structure. 
 If so, one would expect to find the same impacts on entry and exit rates.  Hence, we show 
in Figures 6 to 9 the comparison of raw versus adjusted entry and exit rates.  What lessons are 
present in the Figures?  Consider first the evidence on entry.  One finds that adjusted entry rates 
show considerable fluctuation and rise more than raw data for both joint and single returns.  This 
can be interpreted either as evidence of a slight increase in risk-taking in the data, or perhaps a 
response to more general trends in business structure.  For example, there was a marked increase 
in outsourcing during the 1980s which led to increased numbers of independent contractors.  
This may appear as a rise in those classified as “entrepreneurial” in our tax data.    
 In contrast to the entry rates, while the adjusted exit rates show evidence of shifts over 
the 1980s, there is little change in the raw rates.  And, to the extent that changes are present, the 
movements in raw rates are much smaller than in the adjusted data.  This suggests that changes 
in the observable factors helped to diminish the volatility caused by unobservable factors. 
 The discussion thus far has focused on the “taste” for entrepreneurship and the “skill” for 
survival—some of the unobserved components of overall entrepreneurship that influence the 
rates of business activity, but are not shown in observable ways on the tax return.  We turn now, 
instead, to looking at the direct influence of observables on the rates of entrepreneurship.  In 
keeping with previous literature, we focus on the role of capital and debt access in the remaining 
Figures.   
To get a flavor of the analysis, consider Figure 10.  In the figure, we use our estimates of 
the impact of C, by year, to show the difference between the adjusted rate of entrepreneurship 
with Cit=0 and the adjusted rate with Cit=1.  As the figure makes clear, the association between 
entrepreneurship and capital income is quite strong throughout the sample period, a result that is 
echoed among the single returns (see Figure 11).   
An equally interesting result from Figures 10 and 11 is that entrepreneurship rates 
increase over time for both categories—with and without access to capital.  Figures 12 and 13 
take a closer look at entry rates by capital access, and reveal substantially more volatility as 
observed previously.  Those with access to capital are consistently more likely to enter, but entry 
rates tend to trend upwards only for single filers over time.  Somewhat surprisingly, the largest 
upward trend in entry is observed among single filers without access to capital. 
As shown in Figure 14, exit rates trend upward over time for joint filers.  The patterns are 
not as clear for single filers (see Figure 15).  For each of these figures, though, access to capital 
translates into a much lower exit rate from entrepreneurial activity.  Similar analysis with our 
broad definition of entrepreneurship yielded nearly identical patterns.  In the end, access to 
capital has the expected effect of increasing entry rates and decreasing exit rates, regardless of 
filing status or entrepreneurial activity definitions. 
We performed a similar analysis for the access to debt, as measured by the presence of 
mortgage interest deductions.  This exercise revealed patterns of overall entrepreneurial activity 
and entry that are similar to those for the analysis of access to capital and do not warrant lengthy 
additional discussion.  In sum, access to debt has the expected effect of increasing entry and 
overall entrepreneurship rates. 
The effects of access to debt on exit rates were far less intuitive.  Access to debt seems to 
have little effect on exit rates when the narrow definition is used, but a slight negative effect on 
exit rates when the broad definition is used.  These patterns are similar but far less uniform for 
single filers.  While access to capital can enhance both entry and survival, debt appears only to 
help in the start-up phase of entrepreneurial activity. 
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II. THE ENTREPRENEURIAL LIFE-CYCLE: A TAX PERSPECTIVE 
 
Thus far we have noted that alternative, tax-based measures of entrepreneurship give 
similar (if not identical) insights into the overall prevalence and year-to-year variation in 
entrepreneurship.  Moreover, the movements into and out of entrepreneurship in these tax-based 
data appear to have the same relationships to capital-access and the ability to borrow as found in 
other settings.  These findings provide support for the notion that tax-based data accurately 
reflect entrepreneurial dynamics in the economy. 
Tax data have advantages over other data sets, however.  In particular, our tax-return data 
show a variety of forms for business activity: sole-proprietorships, partnerships, sub-chapter S 
corporations, rental businesses, and so forth.  Hence, they allow us to examine a distinct, but 
closely related, question: does there exist an individual-specific sequence of indicators of 
entrepreneurship?  That is, is there a life-cycle to the kinds of business forms that an individual 
will adopt? 
To address this question, we use our panel data to compute empirical estimates of the 
individual-specific probability of making transitions from one business form to another.  To be 
concrete, consider Table 1, which shows the 8x8 transition matrix.  To construct the table, we 
classified returns on the basis of the business activity: (1) none, (2) sole-proprietorship only, 
(3) sole-proprietorship and partnership or S-corporation, (4) sole-proprietorship and partnership 
or S-corporation and rental or royalty (“all”), (5) sole-proprietorship and rental or royalty, 
(6) partnership or S-corporation only, (7) partnership or S-corporation and rental or royalty, and 
(8) rental or royalty only.  To the extent that there is a dominant dynamic sequence of business 
forms, one would expect the individual-level transitions to follow a common path.  If, on the 
other hand, choices for business formats are driven by idiosyncratic matters, one would expect an 
equal distribution in the table. 
What do we learn from Table 1?  Each entry shows the fraction of returns in the 
corresponding row that make a transition to the status shown in the corresponding column.  
Thus, for example, among single returns 1.1 percent of individuals who had no business activity 
made a transition to sole-proprietorship the next year, while the corresponding rate was 2.7 
percent among joint returns.  Or, to take another example, 0.96 percent of single sole-proprietors 
took on partnership or S-corporation activity in the next year; the corresponding rate for joint 
returns was 1.1 percent. 
The patterns in Table 1 suggest several themes.  First, the diagonal entries show that the 
dominant transition is “more of the same.”  Thus, despite the notoriously high exit rates of small 
firms, the data contain considerable year-to-year correlation in activities.   
Second, the next most likely transition is to “exit entirely.”  That is, even when there are 
multiple business activities—in the extreme “all”—the second most likely transition is to have 
“none” in the next year—roughly 20 percent among both single and joint returns.  This is quite a 
striking result. 
In similar fashion, the third observation is that “purists”—those engaged only in a sole-
proprietorship, partnership, S-corporation, or rental business—are “all or nothing.”  That is, the 
sum of the probabilities of staying the same and exiting to “none” is higher than for any other 
possibilities.   
Lastly, to the extent that a there is a transition, it usually takes the form of adding a new 
business activity.  Thus, we don’t see the transformation of a single business to a new form, but 
rather the addition of other business forms.  This latter observation, in particular, militates 
against a “growth chain” view in which a start-up business moves deterministically through a 
series of formats. 
Our final exercise is to merge the insights regarding the importance of capital and debt 
access with our emerging picture of transitional dynamics.  Specifically, in Tables 2 and 3 (for 
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single and joint returns, respectively) we compare the transition rates for those without access to 
capital or debt (top entry in each row) to those with access (bottom entry in each row).   
We leave a detailed inspection of each table to the reader.  For our purposes it is 
interesting to note that the overall pattern of transitional dynamics is similar for both groups, and 
thus reflective of the patterns detailed in Table 1.  However, previous research has shown a 
strong link between access to capital and the rates of entry and survival.  These tax-based data 
support this view, as the entry rates are higher for the bottom entries nearly uniformly, while exit 
rates are lower. 
 
III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Our analysis of a 12-year panel of individual taxpayer data has revealed a number of 
important results.  First and most importantly, the choice of definition of “entrepreneur” has little 
if any impact on the observed trends in entrepreneurship as well as the analysis of some of the 
underlying causes of those trends.  In other words, researchers may not need to worry as much 
about the ability of self-employment or other indicators in survey data to capture entrepreneurial 
activity.   
A second key result is that access to capital and debt have the expected effect of 
increasing entry rates and reducing exit rates.  Nonetheless, regression results indicate that 
demographics and a general increase in risk-taking are also responsible for part of the general 
rise in entrepreneurial activity during the 1980s. 
Finally, no clear life-cycle pattern of entrepreneurial activity emerges from a multi-state 
transition matrix analysis.  Those with one form or another of entrepreneurship tend either to stay 
in that form or to exit entirely.  To the extent that movements among forms take place, they 
typically involve the addition of another form rather than a reduction.  Again, though, these types 
of transitions are clearly the minority of all transitions. 
A number of important questions remain for future research.  For example, the relative 
importance of tax policy must be explored in a more exhaustive multivariate framework.  
Further, additional descriptive detail regarding entrepreneurial finance can be gleaned from these 
data, especially for those filing a Schedule C.    
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FOOTNOTES 
 
 
1. The trend is not restricted to the United States.  Andrews [1998, p. D1] reports “In a historic 
switch that has both amazed and alarmed financial analysts, investors from Frankfurt to Brussels 
to Amsterdam have fallen in love with entrepreneurs… Compared with the attraction in the 
United States.…the infatuation here is in its early stages.  But compared with Europe’s past, it is a 
revolution.” 
 
2. See, for example, Dunn and Holtz-Eakin [2000] for the NLS, Bruce [2001 and 2000] and Gentry 
and Hubbard [2000] for the PSID, Schuetze [2000] for the CPS, or Bruce, Holtz-Eakin, and 
Quinn [2000] for the HRS. 
 
3. We compress five filing status options into two categories—single and married—as follows:  
unmarried heads of household and widow(er)s with dependent children are combined with single 
filers, while married couples filing separately are combined with those filing jointly. 
 
4. Of course, this is not a substitute for a structural analysis of the impact of taxes on 
entrepreneurship.  See Bruce and Holtz-Eakin [2001]. 
 
5. We define entry as having the particular form of entrepreneurial activity on this year’s tax return, 
but not last year’s.  Exit is defined in a similar fashion. 
 
6. See Bruce [2001 and 2000], Bruce and Holtz-Eakin [2001], Carroll, Holtz-Eakin, Rider, and 
Rosen [Forthcoming, 2000a, and 2000b] for recent studies of the role of taxes; Holtz-Eakin, 
Joulfaian, and Rosen [1994a and 1994b], Bruce, Holtz-Eakin and Quinn [2000] on the role of 
capital market constraints; and Holtz-Eakin, Penrod, and Rosen [1996] or Bruce, Holtz-Eakin, 
and Quinn [2000] on the effects of health insurance.  This self-serving list is not meant to be 
exhaustive; more extensive references are contained in each of the articles. 
 
7. Regression results underlying Figure 4 (and subsequent figures) are available from the authors 
upon request. 
 
 
 
